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Introduction:

I was asked by the defense to travel to Bosnia, to find the origins of the men involved in sending money to Pazara. In essence, I was on a fact finding mission to put my hand on the pulse of this unique European Muslim community. I was sent to engage in a fact-finding mission into the actual community and villages in Bosnia where the defendant previously lived. The defense felt that it was essential that I engage in field work on the ground in the former homeland of the defendants to provide the important mission ethnic, political, and religious context for this case.

Experience:

I have both academic and boots-on-the-ground qualifications and experiences dealing with Islamic Eurasia from Kosovo to Kazakhstan to Kashmir. I have a PhD in Central Eurasian Islamic History, a Master's degree in Russian History, and a Master's degree in Central Eurasian Studies. I am a tenured full professor at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth and have previously taught at the University of London.

I have written books on topics related to this case, including one on the Chechens titled "Inferno in Chechnya" and a book on the war in Iraq and Syria titled "Counter Jihad" which was endorsed by CIA director and former head of U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus. I have also worked on the ground as a field investigator for the CIA's counter terrorism center and in Kabul for the U.S. Army's information operations team.

Methodology:

As a full professor of Islamic history who has carried out extensive fieldwork in Islamic Eurasia, both for my own books and at the request of various U.S agencies and the military, I find it necessary to do "boots on the ground" research. This means live interviews with multiple first-hand witnesses, each with a different perspective. Using this method, I have tracked the movements of Taliban suicide bombers in eastern Afghanistan for the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center, explored jihadism in the Himalayan battle zone of Kashmir, traveled in Pakistan in the Pashtun tribal zones where Osama bin Laden was killed in May 2011, been on the front lines with Kurdish Peshmerga troops in Mosul, Iraq as recently as last year, and met with Kosovo liberation army rebels. In each of these cases, I interviewed multiple participants in the events themselves. Experts in my field regularly rely on this kind of information in reaching their conclusions. In fact, first-person interviews are the gold standard of cultural-historical research.

I used the same approach for this research with the aim of exploring the milieu that created the men involved in this case and contextualizing the Bosnians fighting in Syria. My journeys took me up into the rugged mountains of the north that were said to be under the control of “Muslim militants” and down to the symbolic heart of Bosnia, the town of Mostar. On this journey I was able to put my hand on the pulse of the land and people of Bosnia, including family members of one of the accused; Jasmin Jaservitch, a Bosnian volunteer fighter who fought in Syria; and Ibrahim Delic, a religious scholar who has been accused of guiding Bosnians in the ways of the faith during the war in Syria. I was able to compare these accounts with other information to ensure their accuracy.

I was inclined to believe the accounts of the Bosnians' experience in Syria as they have both been sentenced to jail by the Bosnian government for their activities in Syria and had nothing to hide. I found them to be candid and forthcoming. Their account dovetailed with my own in depth knowledge of Bosnia and fighting formations in Syria. I have over a quarter of a century of experience in carrying out the sort of investigation required for this case. I have always felt that there is no substitute for one-on-one interactions with the people I am investigating.

My methodology will infuse this case with one thing that is so often missing in terrorism cases and that is the crucial background context.

Historical Background of Bosnians in Syria:

I first traveled in Bosnia in 1986 and came to know this European Republic that was a part of multi-ethnic Communist Yugoslavia. There I found a secularized Slavic culturally Muslim people who were more European and Westernized than any Muslim nation I have seen since. The Bosnians that I saw were more inclined to drink in the bars that dotted the beautiful old Ottoman city of Sarajevo than to attend Mosque. Of all of the people in Communist Yugoslavia, it was the Bosnians who most often identified as Yugoslavs. They would regularly go to beaches on the Dalmatian coast to sun bathe in the Adriatic Sea, their women were rarely head scarfed, and their practice of Islam seemed to apply mainly to life rituals of marriage, birth, death and not much more. Their form of Islam, it should be stated, was Sufi mystical Islam of the sort the Ottoman Turks had practiced for centuries. This relaxed frontier form of Islam had been infused with Western concepts of woman's rights, pluralism and Democracy over the century of Austrian-Hapsburg rule and secularized during the Communist period. It in no way shape or form resembled the austere, puritanical form of Islam that exists in Saudi Arabia where fanatical Wahhabism dominates.

In the 1990s, I watched as Christian Serbs and Croats launched a genocidal war to exterminate the Bosnians and in the process introduced to the world the hate filled term “ethnic cleansing.” The Bosnians were saved only through the intervention of the United States which, under President Bill Clinton, bombed the Serbs and ended the bloody siege of Sarajevo. The Bosnians to this very day have a deep sense of gratitude to the Americans for saving them and I found pictures of President Bill Clinton adorning the walls of restaurants, coffee shops, bazaars, etc. There was none of the anti-Americanism or hatred of the so-called “Great Satan” (America) and “Little Satan” (Israel) that I found

in much of the Arab world (Bosnians do not closely identify with the Arab Palestinians because they are a Slavic people). As an American, in both 1986 and 2017, I traveled widely and safely and was welcomed in Mosques (where attendance was much lower than the bars), people's homes, festivals and coffee shops. Most Bosnians I met dreamed of moving to America, a land that they saw as being filled with equality and opportunities. By contrast they saw the Arab world with its alien form of puritanical Islam and rigged Wahhabi dominated cultures as intimidating.

Having spent time in countries like Pakistan, where I regularly encountered anti-American sentiment and even parades where people chanted, "Death to America!" I found the atmosphere in Bosnia to be welcoming. While Islam was woven into the rich fabric of Bosnian society, as best demonstrated by the graceful ancient Ottoman Turkish Mosques, minarets and palaces that dominated Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities, it was a distinctly apolitical form of Islam. Having spent thirteen years traveling extensively in the Republic of Turkey where secularism was the law of the land until recently, I found Bosnia to be even more westernized and secularized than Turkey. I should also say that Bosnian Sufi Islam has many Christian borrowings, mixtures, and holdovers which harkened back to the days of the Bosnians gradual conversion to the relaxed, frontier form of Ottoman Sufi Islam over the centuries. I have never heard the term jihad or war for the faith spoken in Bosnia, a stark contrast to my exposure to it in realms ranging from Peshawar, Pakistan (The original base of al-Qaeda), to the insurgent jihadist dominated lands of eastern Uzbekistan's Fergan valley, to the prison camps in the deserts of Northern Afghanistan where I extensively interviewed foreign jihadist fighters and Taliban, to London where I interviewed the notorious al-Qaeda recruiter Abu Hamza al-Masri in his infamous Finnsbury Park Mosque before his arrest. The jihadist rhetoric that percolated from London to Kashmir with its anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments did not belong in the forested Green Mountains of Bosnia.

Report from Bosnia:

A. The Bosnian Unit

In the context described above, I began to explore the world of the defendants by making a journey with my teammates, Chris and Chinau, up far to the north from the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo to the town of Jelah. In Jelah, I met Jasmin Jaservitch. I had been told by Chris and Chinau, two British investigators assisting me, that Jasmin had fought, alongside Abdullah Pazara, in the unit of Bosnians that had volunteered to fight Assad in Syria. After initial introductions, Jasmin told me his story and the bizarre story of his fellow Bosnian volunteers who traveled to Syria to join in the fight against the so-called "Butcher of Aleppo", President Bashar al-Assad. During our discussion, Jasmin told the story of European Slavic, Sufi, ex-Communist Muslims, who hardly fit the paradigm of transnational jihadist fighters of the sort I have long studied, traveling to a land different from their own. Jasmin told me that between 80 and 120 Bosnians, on an ad-hoc basis, often relying on Facebook contacts, traveled through Turkey and into Syria to join a fighting unit based to the east of Aleppo. He reported that most of the Bosnians there seemed to feel they were aligned with or fighting for the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is backed and supported by the CIA. Jasmin reported seeing American weaponry, including what he thought might have been anti-tank weapons and small arms. He spoke

with a surprisingly free and humor-filled voice about a unit that had limited training and was utilized primarily for guard duty due to its lack of military experience. Unlike the hardened Wahhabi Arab Jihadi fanatics or even the legendary Chechen highlanders who were fighting as much against the Russian-backed Assad regime as for Jihad, the Bosnians appeared to have been militarily ineffective. In fact, one time Jasmin broke into laughter and told us that the Arab Emirs (or commanders) punished the Bosnians for spending too much time on Facebook by putting them in charge of peeling potatoes for the troops. He referred to the Bosnians as the “Potato Peeler or Facebook Brigade” and on another occasion said, “The Chechens were wolves and we were like little coyotes following them.”

For a portion of their time in Syria, the Bosnians, who usually served as auxiliaries and guards, fought under a Chechen commander named Saluhddin Al Shishani. Saluhddin, who refused to swear an oath of allegiance (*bayat*) to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, should not be confused with Omar al Shishani, a Chechen commander who did swear bayat to Baghdadi. Saluhddin was seen as more of a moderate, and this was his appeal to the Bosnians.

The Bosnians who followed Saluhddin, it should be noted, did not have the typical extremists’ global jihadi world view. For example, the Bosnians did not go to Syria to fight for the utopian caliphate or Sunni Jihadist theocracy of Caliph al Baghdadi. They went to fight against Assad whom they dubbed the “Butcher of Aleppo.” It was the images of mass graves of slain civilians killed by Assad’s indiscriminate bombings and shabiah death squads that galvanized them—not dreams of an Arab-dominated, trans-national global state at war with the West. In fact, the Bosnians proudly consider themselves to be Westerners.

It should also be noted that the Bosnians, for a while, served in the ranks of *Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar* (The Army of Emigrants and Supporters). This group fought under the umbrella of the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army, which was visited by Senator John McCain. The Bosnians were distinguished by their uniforms, berets, insignia, hierarchy, flags, etc., and did not serve as urban terrorists of the sort deployed by ISIS in the Battle of Mosul from October 2016 to July 2017. Saluhddin’s group, the Army of Emigrants and Helpers, never did join ISIS and, instead, boldly proclaimed its independence from this group. At one point, Saluhddin proclaimed that ISIS was engaged in *fitna*, which means insighting civil war amongst Muslims.

The Bosnians were a far cry from the Taliban and Al Qaeda fanatics I have met. The Bosnians considered suicide bombings to be repugnant and none engaged in them, while hundreds of Sunni Arabs in Syria engaged in this tactic. It should be further noted that a former Jihadi in Afghanistan named Osama bin Laden tried having Western journalists whom he stumbled across in Afghanistan murdered as infidels. ISIS, similarly, beheaded any Westerner they could capture, due to their extreme hatred of the West. By contrast, when I met Jasmin, he embraced me and the rest of my team. No Wahhabi Salafite jihadist, who hate America and the Christian West, would touch an “unclean crucifixer infidel” like myself. Far from being an America-hating fanatic, Jasmin gushed with questions about America, expressed dreams of moving there one day, and happily invited us to watch him partake in evening prayers in his Mosque in his home village. I have

taken a video of Jasmin praying with three other congregants and his *imam* in their mosque. No one minded me, Chris, or Chinua sitting at the back of the mosque filming them. I would never risk my life filming in a mosque in some of the places I've been to in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Arab world. But in Bosnia I felt quite safe, and this defines and captures the unique nature of Bosnian Islam of the sort that those volunteer fighters who went to Syria to fight Assad espoused.

In my conversations with Jasmin, he mentioned the fact that the Bosnians, who were often bored with guard duty, exaggerated their exploits on Facebook. This is why they dubbed themselves the Facebook Brigade. As fishermen are known to exaggerate their fish stories, the Bosnians often exaggerated their exploits, according to Jasmin. Jasmin told me the Bosnian "coyotes" dreamed of being like the Chechen "wolves". Their work in distributing aid, acting as guards, or serving as auxiliaries was not as glorious as being frontline warriors like the Chechens, who were legends in Syria and beyond. It seems quite probable that Abdullah Pazara was typical in this sense, and he too may have been a coyote who, like the rest of his unit, dreamed of being a wolf.

I should also note there was tremendous fluidity amongst the anti-Assad forces fighting in Syria. It was not uncommon for a charismatic commander to switch allegiance and for his fighting men to come along with him to join another group based on allegiance to that commander. The Afghan warriors who I lived with in Afghanistan had a word for this prestige of a commander: *nam*. It is possible, and indeed probable, that the Bosnians on occasion were shifted to fight in the ranks of other *ad hoc* units without having any real understanding of who they were fighting for based merely on their allegiance to a known commander. The Bosnians, in my estimation, were at a loss in Syria when it came to understanding the macro bird's eye overview of this complex battle zone. They were foreigners in a strange land who did not speak the local language, did not understand the complexities involving the kaleidoscope of jostling anti-Assad forces, and their almost whimsical foray into Syria was so unimportant in the grand scheme of things that it is rarely recorded or noticed by those who are historicizing the Syrian civil war. The quixotic journey to Syria of the Bosnian Facebook Brigade in no way shape or form led to any reshaping of the Syrian battlefield or to any single battle, skirmish, or firefight that I am aware of. It was, in hindsight, a tragic journey by members of the most moderate Muslim community on the planet to a land that had been consumed by fanaticism and civil war that repelled them and ultimately led them to return home to their native vales in the forested mountains of the European country known as Bosnia.

The real tragedy here is that dozens of Bosnian volunteers who saw the bloody siege of Aleppo by Assad murderous forces as similar to the genocidal assault on their own capital by Serbian war criminals died for their sense of altruism but yet made no impact on the war which was ultimately decided by the intervention of Vladimir Putin in the fall of 2015. In other words, they gave their lives for nothing.

Jasmin spoke of a clear hierarchy with commanders identified by insignia, rank, and special duties ranking from artillery to paramedics to platoon sized fighting units. The common thread was that there was an order to things in Syria. The Bosnians were at the bottom of the hierarchy and viewed as somewhat of an oddity. Their voyage to Syria seemed to me to be rather quixotic, and Jasmin mentioned that those involved all had

regrets for having partaken in their volunteer mission. Jasmin seemed to be particularly depressed about the infighting amongst the Arab units and the strange consolation of jihad groups that were competing for power, glory, and resources. He complained that they had less structure, organization, and hierarchy than his unit, even though he acknowledged that their fanaticism, zeal, and devotion to jihad made them better fighters.

When our interview was over, Jasmin offered to take us to his mosque to witness him at evening prayers in the village of Teslik. We had been told that this was a hotbed of jihadism, but as is often the case when such hype abounds, we found nothing of the sort. On the contrary we were welcomed into the mosque where we met the kindly Imam who donned a European Bosnian cap, not a turban, and we were allowed to film them in their evening prayers. Our interview ended with Jasmin posing for more selfies and hugging Chinau in front of the basketball hoop built out in front of the village mosque. We then drove into the nearby town of Tesanje to join the locals who were drinking beers and watching the high school prom beneath an imposing Ottoman castle and came away with mixed emotions.

The overall perception we had was of a group of volunteers with often limited knowledge of Islam feeling the urge to take action, to end the slaughter in Aleppo that so clearly echoed the slaughter of their people in the 1990s. This is an important concept to understand. Jasmin and the family of Ramiz Hodzic all felt the salient urge that drove the Bosnian men to Syria was a sense of humanitarianism to defend a distant people undergoing something so eerily similar to what they had experienced at the hands of Serbian war criminals like Milošević during the 1990s ethnic cleansing of their people. Our next foray led us up into another supposed “jihadist enclave” to interview the Bosnian religious leader, or “Imam”, named Ibrahim Delic, who was said to have overseen the Bosnian fighters in Syria and infused them with a sense of Islamic faith that they were missing.

The information we received from Jasmin regarding the Bosnian was corroborated by Delic. Tracking down and finding Ibrahim Delic was a task that took hours, but after knocking on doors, visiting mosques and traveling deeper into a remote valley we were able to find the “notorious” Ibrahim Delic. He was living in an area where there were more woman wearing head scarves, but ,when we yelled up to a group of woman chatting on the front porch and asked them where Ibrahim lived, an old woman eagerly ran down, hugged us and guided us to his house. We then had an extraordinary opportunity to knock on his door and meet the Imam of the Bosnians in Syria. At first, he seemed reluctant to talk to us, but after explaining that I was a historian of Ottoman history who was deeply intrigued in learning about the role of the Bosnians in Syria and not a sensationalist journalist trying to “parachute in” and write a story, he agreed to give us an interview. He gave us a fascinating perspective on the so-called “Bosnian jihad,” only it quickly turned out that it was not much of a jihad at all.

Ibrahim had learned that groups of young Bosnian men were traveling to Syria to fight Assad and became concerned. He told us that very few of them had a grasp of Islam and its basic teachings and he felt they needed a religious leader. So Ibrahim, who despite his intimidating long beard proved to be quite gregarious, told us he traveled through Turkey

to Aleppo to the Bosnian barracks where he taught his countrymen in Syria the basics of their faith. He organized Friday prayers, sermons, etc.

The main takeaway I got from my interview with Ibrahim Delic was that he was devoid of the fury, Salafite Wahhabi rhetoric of jihadism of the sort I had devoted 25 years of my life to studying. He was resigned to his impending jail sentence by the Bosnian government, was gentle, devout, firm in his views and proud. But yet he was eager to talk with an American Christian like myself. In retrospect, having myself been embedded with, and advised American soldiers in Afghanistan in 2009 as a member of a U.S Army information operations team and lectured to Marines deploying to Afghanistan, and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) I know that the origins of a fighting man are crucial to understanding his subsequent trajectory into battlefields both near and far. All of the great modern war movies such as Hacksaw Ridge, American Sniper or Lone Survivor all begin with a snapshot of the protagonist's hometown, family, church and community. Such background vignettes are necessary for the creation of the main character. I have myself been infuriated with how U.S troops are described as fanatical storm troopers or automatons in places I have visited like Pakistan. I go to great lengths in my discussions with friends in Lahore, Pakistan or Istanbul, Turkey to infuse American soldiers with human qualities, context and origin.

The defendants in this case, the Bosnians, are equally representative of their origins and context. Just as the American sniper, Chris Kyle, was taught by his Dad to defend the sheep (i.e someone in distress) and to cherish his family Bible on his missions; the Bosnians too needed contextualization. And I must say, everything that I found on the ground in my field research leads to the conclusion that the Bosnian volunteers were far removed from the dominant image of ISIS fighters beheading Americans in the desert or stoning sinners who drink alcohol or smoke (in fact both Jasmin and Ibrahim said the Bosnians were lax Muslims who drank and smoked). They seemed to have felt that their well-organized unit was at times fighting for the Free Syrian Army, which was backed by the CIA. They were auxiliary fighters and guards at best, and played no role whatsoever in the creation of ISIS infrastructure and network based in distant Raqqa, Syria. Raqqa, Syria, it should be noted, is in the deserts of central Syria, far removed from the Bosnian's base outside of Aleppo in the northwest.

I think it is dangerous to conflate Bosnians with either the Chechens, who served above them as elite fighters, or with the array of fanatics such as Jihadi John, who executed the U.S journalist James Foley amongst other ISIS hostages. While the Bosnians certainly were an organized fighting unit with insignia, as I saw in photographs shown by Jasmin, and stationed in barracks (thus warranting Geneva Convention rights as a recognized fighting unit of several platoons), they were on the edges of events beyond them that they clearly could not control or comprehend.

As to any concept of terrorism against America or the West, this was certainly far beyond their wildest imagination as they were all seemingly grateful for America saving them from genocide in the 1990s. They were also devoid of any of the deep hatred for Israel that the Arabs feel due to their ethnic ties with the Palestinian Arabs. I must say in my decades of interaction with bona-fide, hardcore, anti-American Jihadist terrorists seeking to enforce Sharia law, destroy Israel, kill Shiites and pagan Yazadis (like the ones I

recently visited in Iraq) I found the Bosnians to be out of place in this world of fanatical terrorism I know and understand.

I also asked Ibrahim about ISIS. He appeared to have left Syria before they formed. He knew about their precursor, the Dawlah or the state. Like Jasmin, he appeared to be intimidated by the Dawlah or Nusra Front. He told me upsetting stories about people being shot, strict enforcement of Sharia law and fanaticism of the sort that was anathema to the more moderate Sufi, mystical, European, ex-Communist Bosnians. Ibrahim told me that, by his estimation, God created man to do good and there was no good coming from the events in Syria and called on the Bosnians to return home. He felt a new fight was forming and a darkness was coming which made him conclude that Bosnians did not belong in the sands of Syria that were so alien to them. He reinforced Jasmin's story of the Bosnians as basically third-rate guards who were not really involved in the fray. He felt they were well intentioned and that, if the Americans or anyone else were undergoing the same horrors that the Syrians were under Assad, they would have responded in the same way. Assad's forces have, of course, used barrel bombs, sarin gas, chlorine gas, indiscriminate bombings by the Russians and Assad, and Shabiha or "death squads" which have killed far more than ISIS in the Syrian civil war.

In conclusion, I came away with a greater understanding of the volunteer unit of Bosnians fighting in Syria. This small band of men was driven by the same sense of volunteerism that drove men like George Orwell or Ernest Hemmingway to travel to Spain to fight the dictator General Franco in the Spanish Civil War. I believe such interaction with culture and the respective people is vital and no amount of online Wiki-Intel is a substitute for such authentic, first-hand interaction. It is my opinion, based on interviews and photographs shown to me by Jasmin Jaservitch, that the Bosnian unit had (1) a hierarchy and command structure, (2) generally followed the laws of war (no killing POWs or civilians, etc), (3) carried arms openly, i.e., distinguished themselves from the civilian population and lived in barracks, and (4) had uniforms and insignia to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.

Based on my interviews, the Bosnian Brigade disbanded sometime in mid-2014. This volunteer group disbanded largely due to a distaste for the increasing fanaticism and infighting between the dominant Arab rebel units in Syria

B. Abdullah Ramo Pazara

I was able to learn some about Pazara and his activities in Syria from the first-hand account of Delic. During his brief stay in Aleppo, Delic had the chance to meet Abdullah Pazara. We asked him what he was like and, at this moment, he laughed and said, as everyone said, "He was a good man."

On one occasion, Abdullah even gave Ibrahim his pants because Ibrahim's own pants would not fit him. Delic mentioned that Pazara had adopted several Syrian refugee families and was feeding them via donations from abroad. He and many other Bosnians felt that it was their duty as Muslims and humans who had experienced a similar catastrophe to assist refugees living near them. He mentioned that, while Arab volunteer fighters had wealthy networks from countries like Qatar supporting them, the Bosnians

did not and often relied on friends, family, and personal contacts to fund them, their equipment, and humanitarian efforts.

From Delic, I heard stories of Pazara falling in love with a local woman, getting his car with all of his possessions in it stolen. He was a man whose efforts to adopt Syrian refugees seemed to be a direct outcome of his own experience of seeing his nation being made refugees during the destruction of their own state in the 1990s.

C. The Black Flag

There has been mention of a black flag in this context. I should also contextualize this black flag. Pazara, like all Bosnians, is an heir to the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the Bosnian lands for five centuries as the Sunni Caliph. And the Ottomans acquired the Caliphate from the Abassids in medieval Baghdad. The Abassid flag was the black fighting flag that has been used for centuries since then as an Islamic war and state banner. It has been hijacked and used by many jihadist groups, though even the moderate CIA-backed Free Syrian Army units also fought under black flags. Its meaning in the Bosnian context would appear to be less nefarious than, say, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) claiming it as its own.

Conclusion

Nothing substitutes for on the ground experience in my estimation. Having myself risked my life tracking Taliban suicide bombers in Afghanistan for the CIA's counterterrorism center who were slaughtering innocents in the name of Allah, embedded in the front lines with brave Kurdish female snipers facing Islamic State fighters in Mosul, etc.; I have seen the face of fanatical Islamic terrorism up close. What I witnessed in Bosnia has nothing to do with that world and that context of Wahhabi, Salafite fanaticism. I do not believe from what I have seen that Abdullah Pazara was an ISIS terrorist, nor do I believe that funds sent to him were destined for terrorist causes. It simply does not comport with the images constructed for me by those who knew him as a fellow fighter or friend.

I applaud our government's efforts to uncover ISIS sleeper cells, or terrorist plots against America, but as someone who has known Bosnia since the mid-1980s, lectured to graduate students on its culture at the University of London and in courses I teach at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, published a book on the Chechen conflict and one more recently on the war in Syria, I believe that for all best intentions the government's case seems to be overreach.

In my professional opinion, men who are directed to peel potatoes because they spent too much time on Facebook, who formed a unit that was seemingly delegated to guard duties, and who hail from a moderate, ex-communist, tolerant Sufi Muslim society, do not, in general, represent the sort of fanatical jihadi *junds* (fighting units) that migrated to ISIS in the fateful summer of 2014 when "Caliph" al-Baghdadi proclaimed the Dawlah. In my opinion Abdullah Pazara was fairly unique for the simple fact that he was American and had imbibed so much of the culture. On the contrary, the Bosnians whose café shops are emblazoned with pictures of former President Clinton and beer signs, are a completely different paradigm to the men who carried out killings of Shiites as part of a sectarian

civil war, brutal enforcement of ISIS sharia law or acts of suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism that is far removed from Bosnia's accommodating and tolerant culture.

I also found that the Bosnians' unit met the traditional requirements for a law of war defense in that they had a distinct hierarchy, followed the laws of war, carried arms openly, had uniforms, lived in barracks, and thus distinguished themselves from the civilian population they thought they were defending.

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